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We relate household saving to pension reform, to explain the high household saving rates 
in urban China from a new perspective. We use the exogenous – policy induced - variation 
in pension wealth to explicitly estimate the impact of pension wealth on household saving, 
and obtain a significant offset effect of pension wealth on household saving. Our estima-
tions show that pension reform boosted the household saving rate in 1999 by about 6 per-
centage points for cohort aged 25-29 and by about 3 percentage points for cohort aged 50-
59. Our results also indicate that declining pension wealth reduces expenditure on educa-
tion and health more than on other consumption items. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitetään Kiinan kaupunkialueiden korkeaa säästämisastetta uudesta 
näkökulmasta liittämällä sen eläkeuudistukseen. Poliittisesti päätetty eläkeuudistus vaikutti 
selvästi kotitalouksien eläkevarallisuuteen ja sitä kautta niiden säästämiseen. Eläkevaralli-
suuden supistuminen lisäsi kotitalouksien säästämistä. Tämän tutkimuksen tulosten mu-
kaan eläkeuudistus nosti 25–29-vuotiaiden säästämisastetta 6 prosenttiyksikköä ja 50–59-
vuotiaiden säästämisastetta 3 prosenttiyksikköä. Eläkevarallisuuden supistuminen vähentää 
koulutus- ja terveysmenoja enemmän kuin muuta kulutusta. 
 





 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
1  Introduction  
 
China’s household saving rates climbed continuously during the mid-1990s. Based on offi-
cial statistics, the urban household saving ratio increased from 17% in 1995 to 20% in 
2000 and to 23% in 2004.
1 At the same time, China’s public pension system for urban em-
ployees has been in the process of reform. The most important pension reform began in 
1995, first in several provinces and eventually across the country. At the end of 1997, the 
State Council (Document 26, 1997, State Council) officially implemented the new policy 
and unified the parameters of the system. The reform has been aimed a multi-pillar system. 
Besides the Pay-as-you go (PAYG) pillar, individual accounts were established. However, 
the total replacement ratio declined. The combined target replacement ratio of the first and 
the second pillars is 58.5%, down from 75% in the pre-reform period. Transition arrange-
ments are available to even out the losses of those workers who did not have individual 
accounts before the reform. Although it has often been conjectured that pension reform 
would affect household saving, the relationship between rising household saving rates and 
declining pension benefits requires further exploration.
2  
Numerous studies have attempted to explain household saving rates in China. One 
recent study is by Horioka and Wan (2007), which investigated saving rates of urban, rural, 
and all households in 1995-2004 using provincial data from the China household survey. 
They find the significant determinants to be the lagged saving rate, income growth rate, 
real interest rate, inflation rate, and (in one case) demographic structure. Modigliani and 
Cao (2004) use time series data from 1953 to 2000 and find that long-term economic 
growth and demographic structure are the two main factors contributing to the high house-
hold saving rate. More comprehensive explanations for China’s high household saving 
have been given in an earlier paper by Karry (2000), focusing more on saving behavior in a 
period of comprehensive urban economic reform. He uses the panel of provincial saving 
data before 1995. According to his estimations, none of the variables future income 
growth, future income uncertainty and dependency ratio is significant for urban areas in 
1978-83 and 1984-89. Using household level data for 1995 to 2005, Chamon and Prasad 
 
1 This is calculated from household survey data as the difference between disposable income and consump-
tion expenditure divided by disposable income. The data is from China’s statistics yearbook. 
2 The other effect of pension reform on aggregate household saving is that growth of pension distribution in 
the 1990s would have had a negative impact on the incentive to save for old age, as inferred by Modigliani 
and Cao (2004). But the extension of the pension system occurred at a slow pace. Contributors as a percent-
age of urban employees was 44% in 1992 and 45% in 2002 (Yuan and Feng, 2005).  Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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(2008) find evidence suggesting that precautionary motives and the rising private burden of 
social expenditures eg on health, education and housing, have driven the increase in 
household saving rates. Meng (2003) uses micro data to test the permanent income and 
precautionary saving hypotheses for urban China. The results indicate that urban house-
holds in China have strong precautionary saving motives. However, not all of the previous 
studies were able to explicitly consider factors such as the social insurance program and 
old-age pensions. 
On the other hand, the relationship between pension wealth and household saving 
is inconclusive in the literature. The life-cycle model predicts that an increase in future 
pension wealth will be offset by a decline in individuals’ saving. But in a general set-up 
more applicable to developing countries like China, both the sign and size of the incentive 
from future pension entitlements to savings requires more careful investigation. First, if 
current generations feel altruistic towards their offspring, who will be financing the current 
payouts, the expansion of the social security system may lead to increased private saving to 
compensate for larger future contributions (Barro, 1978). Secondly, credit market imper-
fections reduce the importance of the life cycle motive for saving, as borrowing constraints 
limit the extent to which social security crowds out private savings (Diamond-Hausman, 
1984; Dicks Mireaux-King, 1984).Thirdly, limited economic and financial literacy may 
hinder an individual’s assessment of pension wealth, which may limit the extent of the off-
set between pension and non-pension wealth (Bernheim, 1994). Therefore, predicting the 
impact of changes in pension wealth on private saving comes down to empirical analysis 
There are only a few empirical studies on this topic as regards developing coun-
tries. Empirical results from developed countries have shown great variability over time 
and across countries. One reason for the inconclusive results is that the variation in pension 
benefits has not been exogenous. Several studies have treated pension reform as an exoge-
nous variation of pension wealth and have found a substantial offset effect in certain peri-
ods of the life cycle. For example, Attansio and Brugiavini (2003) and Bottai, et al.(2006) 
study the variation in pension wealth induced by a substantial legislative change in Italy in 
1992, and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) treat major UK pension reforms as natural ex-
periments.  
In this paper we attempt to explain household saving behavior in China from a 
new perspective, treating the pension reform of 1995-1997 as the source of exogenous 
variation in pension wealth. Our data are from CHIP (China Household Income Projects) BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
and include enough information to allow us to compute pension wealth at the individual 
level. Using micro data, it is possible to take account of the effects of pension reform on 
household saving of various cohorts. For a younger cohort, a decline in future pension 
benefits has less effect on saving, because they have more time to absorb the change before 
retirement. We consider this life-cycle effect explicitly by allocating the present discounted 
value of pension benefits to each period of life and estimating the effects on saving. Using 
micro data, it is also possible to obtain more measurements of household saving. We 
measure household savings, including and excluding investment on human capital (expen-
diture on education and health), in order to examine the effects of pension wealth on hu-
man capital investment. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a brief introduction to 
Chinese pension reform and its impact on the pension wealth of different cohorts. In sec-
tion 3 we discuss the theoretical model and deal with econometric issues. Section 4 de-
scribes the data set and how the valid sample of households is obtained. In the appendix, 
we explain the method of computing pension wealth and report on and compare pension 
wealth among the sample households. Section 5 presents the main results and compares 
them with results of other studies. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  China’s pension reform and its impacts on pension 
wealth 
 
In China, the public pension scheme is available for urban employees. Before the mid-
1990s the arrangement was the same for employees in the public sector and in enterprises.
3 
The first formal public pension system was established in 1951 and covered only public 
sector employees and SOE workers. It was a PAYG system on the enterprise basis and 
covered about 75%-90% of a worker’s wage. In addition, enterprises provided housing, 
medical care and social security to their workers. In the 1980s the unfunded employer-
sponsored pension became unsustainable during the move toward a market economy. 
Many of the old industries lacked the resources to finance pensions. Older enterprises bur-
dened with large social security obligations could not compete with new enterprises with 
 
3 Public sector here refers to institutions and state organs that are mainly financed by fiscal spending, such as 
government sector, education sector, health sector etc. Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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young workers. Moreover, an enterprise-based pension system deters worker mobility. In 
1986 the state council encouraged pension pooling at the municipal level on the pay-as-you 
go basis. During the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, there was a series of reforms in 
pension system, including enlarging the pooling base from county to municipal level and  
extending coverage from state-owned enterprises to other enterprises. However, the system 
that was characterized by PAYG with generous retirement benefits remained unchanged 
until 1995. During 1995-1997, the pension reform was directed at a multi-pillar system 
with a declining replacement ratio. 
The most recent framework for pension reform was established in July 1997. The 
new system has three pillars: a pooling account to redistribute to all beneficiaries, compul-
sory individual accounts, and voluntary supplementary pensions provided via commercial 
insurance. The first pillar imposes a payroll tax of 17% (paid by employers) to ensure that 
employees who have worked more than 15 years have a replacement rate of 20%. The sec-
ond pillar (paid jointly by employers and employees) establishes an individual account for 
each employee. The contribution rate for this is 11% of an individual’s wage, of which the 
employer contributes 3%. After retirement, the employee gets a monthly benefit from this 
account amounting to the accumulated value divided by 120. The combined target re-
placement ratio of the first and second pillars is 58.5%. 
4 The mandatory retirement age is 
60 for males and 55 for females. 
The reform of the late-1990s reduced the replacement ratio of pensions for enter-
prise workers, especially for younger workers. According to the reform framework, those 
who had retired before 1997 (old workers) remained in the original PAYG system, those 
who entered the labor market in or after 1997 (new workers) came under the new three-
pillar pension system, and those who started work before 1997 and retired or will retire af-
ter 1997 (middle workers) were covered by a transitional plan.
5  During that period, the 
public pension for employees in the public sector remains unchanged. Table 1 summarizes 




4 This is based on the assumption that life expectancy is 70 and the rate of growth of real wages equals the 
real interest rate. If one contributes to the system for 35 years, the individual account could provide a 38.5% 
replacement rate. The two pillars have a combined replacement rate of 58.5%. 
5 The transitional arrangements vary across provinces, but there is a basic rule for the transition benefit: bene-
fit in transition= indexed avg monthly income * adjustment coefficient * number of years without individual 
account. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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real wage growth rate  real wage growth rate 
 
Though there was a reduction in the replacement ratio in the 1997 reform, the 
transitional arrangement was adopted to compensate for the losses of workers who did not 
have individual accounts and hence had no accumulation in the account before the reform. 
So the transitional arrangement left pension entitlements affected less for workers who 
were on the verge of retirement while greatly affecting younger workers. However, the re-
form affects pensions of so-called middle man. For those very young, i.e., those who en-
tered labor market in 1997, there is no effect.   
Pension wealth is defined as the present discounted value of future benefits, and 
net pension wealth is the net value after deducting the present discounted value of future 
contributions. The reform rules implied that workers of different age groups were affected 
in different ways in terms of pension wealth. We compute pension wealth for the samples 
of the 1999 survey according to the policy before and after the reform. Details of the com-
putation of pension wealth are given in the appendix. Figure 1 compares average pension 
wealth at each age before and after reform for males aged 25-59 and for females aged 25-
54. It shows that pension wealth declined in every age after reform, the younger the 
worker, the greater the reduction in pension wealth. For example, for an average male of 
25, net pension wealth declined 53.59%, for an average male of 55, net pension wealth de-Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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clined 29.42%. For females aged 25 and 40, net pension wealth declined 65.45% and 
42.87% respectively. 
 





























Note: computation method for pension wealth given in appendix. Data for computing pension wealth are from Chinese 
Household Income Project (CHIP), explained in the following section. The figures give pension wealth for indivdiduals 
working in enterprises in the 1999 survey. 
 
It is noteworthy that the number of workers in enterprises contributing to the pub-
lic pension system was about 45% of total urban employees during 1995-2000. Employees 
in the public sector accounted for 11% of total urban employees. During the same period, 
there has been no development of the private pension scheme in China.
6 Up to 2000, the 
total of private pensions was 19 billion RMB, which was about 8% of revenue flowing into 
the public pension fund in 2000. The number of workers covered by the private pension 
 
6 Calculations based on China statistic yearbook, 2005. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




scheme is 5.6 million, i.e. about 5% of those covered by public pensions. So we do not take 
account of private pension in this paper.
7 
 
3  Theoretical framework and empirical specification 
 
A. The Model 
Since one of the motivations of this paper is to explain the saving behavior in china after 
the mid-1990s, we consider the relationship between public pension wealth and household 
saving rate instead of that between pension wealth and other financial wealth. This ap-
proach is similar to Attansio and Brugiavini (2003). Public pension wealth is measured by 
the present discounted value of future entitlements, and we adjust it to an annual scale 
comparable to annual household savings. We use a life-cycle model in which a household 
at time periodi chooses current and future consumption to maximize lifetime utility, sub-
ject to a lifetime budget constraint, which includes current household assets, future earn-
ings and future pension benefits. 
8 Given a logarithmic utility function, the household 
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where   indexes age or time,   is consumption in each period, t t C β is the time pref-
erence rate,   is the real interest rate,   is real cash earnings in each period,   is real 
pension benefits during the period after retirement, 
r t E t P
i A  is the household’s initial assets at 
time  , T  is life span, and TR is retirement age. Maximization of (1) implies the determi-
nation of initial consumption (equation (3)) and consumption growth in each period after 
time i(equation (4)). The consumption in each period depends on the present value of total 
compensation, including future earnings and pensions. 
i




                                                
                    (3) 
 
7 Data are from China Labor statistic yearbook, 2006 
8 We use a simple model to get a clear relationship between pension wealth and household saving behavior in 
life cycle. In this model, we don't explicitly consider other motivations for saving and uncertainty of income 
and life expectancy.   Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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The household saving plan for age t′is given by equation (5), where  t FE ′is the 
present discounted value of future earnings at age t ′  and t FP′ is the present discounted 
value of pension benefits at age t .  ′ t A′is the present value of past earnings and initial assets 
at age  . Equation (5) shows that pension wealth has the same effect on consumption or 
saving as future earnings and other wealth in a setting where retirement is the motivation 
for. Moreover, it also shows that there is a crowding out effect of pension wealth on 
household saving rate in each period. A permanent reduction in pension wealth implies an 
increase in the saving rate. The relationship depends on the size of the change of pension 
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Equation (5) determines saving behavior when the household can anticipate future 
wealth at age  . When the household experiences an unexpected change in pension wealth 
or future earnings at age t , it will re-optimize its saving behavior, taking account of the 
changed pension wealth and future earnings. Now we have 
i
′
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where  are the same as in equation (5) and  , t FE FP ′ t ′ t A ′ in equation (6) de-
notes household assets at age  .  t ′





















. This is a means of allocating present discounted value of all kinds of wealth to 
all future periods from the age at which a remaining-life plan is made. The adjusted pen-
sion wealth then can be treated as part of the household’s permanent income. If the adjust-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




ment is ignored, we get an underestimation of the effect.
 9 The adjustment factor gives the 
effect of a shock on a household at age t′. A younger household experiences a smaller ef-
fect of a given change in present value of pension wealth than does an older household. 
The intuition for this result is that younger households have a longer horizon over which to 
smooth consumption and absorb unexpected changes. Therefore we adjust the present 
value of pension wealth, explicitly taking the life-cycle effect into consideration. If we as-
sume a household does not experience a reform, we apply the adjustment factor in equation 
(5). If the household is observed in the year immediately after reform, we apply equation 
(6).
10 For the same reason, these factors are also used to adjust the present value of future 
earnings.  
To get a better understanding of the effect we are estimating, it is necessary to 
compare it with the offset effect between pension wealth and other wealth estimated in 
many other papers (e.g. Dicks-Mireaux & King, 1984; Gale, 1998). We relate the change 
in private wealth to adjusted pension wealth instead of private wealth to pension wealth. If 
we assume the marginal effect of pension wealth on saving rate lasts in each period of 
time, this effect amounts to the offset effects estimated in other papers.  
 
B. Empirical specification 
Following the logic of the model, we use the household saving rate as the dependent vari-
able in regression. In the theoretical model, pension wealth is indistinguishable from future 
earnings, but in reality future earnings are more liquid than pension wealth, while pension 
wealth accrues over the retirement period with a more determined pattern than future earn-
ings. Therefore, it is reasonable that we allow different effects for them in the regression. 
We could include both as explanatory variables, each divided by current household in-
come. Alternatively, we use age, education and occupation to proxy future earnings and do 
not include the explicit future earnings in regression. We estimate the following equation: 
 
it n n it it it SR c d PW X t β γ θ =+ + + + ∑ δ + ε
                                                
                (7) 
 
9 The idea of adjustment is similar to that of Gale (1998). However, the adjustment factor is different from 
that in relating private wealth to pension wealth proposed by Gale (1998). He stressed that the offset effect of 
pension wealth is increasing with the years household has been in the pension system: the longer a household 
in the system, the larger the effect of pension wealth.  
10 This adjustment is also used in Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), but what our use is a little different from 
theirs. They treat the period after retirement as just one period, we consider it to be the number of periods as 
the years from retirement age to age of death. Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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where  is saving rate of household iat time  ,  is the ratio of adjusted 
pension wealth to household income, the  are dummies for age of household head to cap-
ture other life-cycle effects,  is a vector that includes occupation of household head, 
education of household head, and household size. Besides pension reform, other benefits 
for enterprises such as housing, medical care and employment guarantee were gradually 
dismantled in the 1990s.
it SR t it PW
n d
it X
11 In public sector, there was a tendency to reduce employment 
and reduce government investment. Some sectors, such as health care, underwent a mar-
ketization process. All these reforms increase the uncertainty of future income and expen-
diture and may have significant impacts on urban household saving behavior.  t θ  represents 
the time effect, capturing macroeconomic and other policy shocks during this period. 
We are concerned with the offset effect γ , which is supposed to be negative ac-
cording to equations (5) and (6). We estimate equation (7) for households whose head 
works in the public sector and in enterprises separately, to avoid the possible selection 
problems when there are some unobservable factors determining one working in different 
sectors. But even though we split samples, OLS regression to estimate γ  raises problems. 
First, as the calculation of pension wealth is based on the projection of future earnings, 
both of which are unobserved and inevitably involve measurement errors. There are also 
assumptions for several parameters such as, life expectancy, real interest rate, real wage 
growth rate and time discount rates. All these factors introduce bias in γ  with simple OLS 
regression. Moreover, an additional source of bias is introduced by the possibility that un-
observable individual and employer characteristics influencing household saving behavior 
are related to variables used in computing pension wealth. In order to get an unbiased esti-
mation, we use the instrumental variable technique. Since the pension system was re-
formed for enterprises in the mid-1990s and an exogenous change of pension wealth oc-
curred for employees in enterprises, we take advantage of this policy change to create IVs. 
We also use interaction terms for the time dummy and age dummies, and the interaction 
terms for the time dummy and province dummies as IVs because changes caused by policy 
during this period varied across ages and provinces. 
                                                 
11 In year 1998, State Council issued a document to stop the housing benefits which lasted 40 years (“Circu-
lar on further reform on urban housing system and acceleration of the housing construction”). In year 1998 
State Council started health insurance reform for urban employees (“Decision on the establishment of basic 
health insurance system for urban employees”). In year 1998, SOE reform required enterprises using 3 years 
to reduce the redundant employees through displacement and lay off.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
4  Data 
 
The data were collected by Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) of China Academy 
of Social Science. The data collection consisted of two distinct samples of urban and rural 
populations of China, selected from the larger samples drawn by the State Statistical Bu-
reau (approximately 65,000 rural households and 35,000 urban households). The CHIP is 
based on a survey of 7998 rural households in 19 provinces and 6931 urban households in 
11provinces. There are three waves available, for years 1988, 1995 and 2002, and there is a 
specific survey on urban households in 1999, which includes 5300 sample households in 
six of the 11 provinces.
12. The 1999 survey focused more on unemployment, so we drop 
the additional samples of unemployment. 
The purpose of CHIP was to measure and estimate the distribution of personal in-
come in both rural and urban areas of China. There are two parts in the data files: one 
where the individual is the unit of analysis and a second where the household is the unit of 
analysis. There is information on the individual’s economic status such as, employment 
status, monthly wage and other sources of income, and demographic variables including 
gender, age and relationship to the household head. Urban households reported income 
from all sources, all types and values of food subsidies received, and total debt. Informa-
tion was also gathered on household accommodations and living conditions. Households 
reported on all their expenditures. 
When projecting the future earnings, we used samples from years 1995, 1999 and 
2002. We used data from 1995 and 1999 as pre-reform and post-reform periods respec-
tively, to estimate the effect of pension wealth on household saving. The sample we used 
includes households in which the head is aged between 25 and 59 if the head is a male, or 
aged between 25 and 54 if the head is a female. Moreover, we limit the sample households 
to those in which the head is covered by the public pension system, which means the head 
is a permanent staff member of an enterprise or in public sector or the head is a long-term 
contract worker. We exclude those households whose head is a temporary worker or short-
term contract worker or employed without contact or self-employed. Households in which 
the head is retired or older than retirement age are excluded, to avoid issues involving the 
saving behavior of the elderly. Households in which there are adults other than head and 
 
12 Six provinces - Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Henan, Sichuan and Gansu - are in 1995, 1999 and 2002 sur-
vey. Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan are included only in the 1995 and 2002 surveys.  Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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spouse are also excluded because these families are in situations that are hard to estimate. 
We also drop households whose head enters into the labor market after the pension reform. 
Therefore the sample consists of 3150 households in 1995 and 1511 households in 1999, 
among which there are 2196 households in 1995 and 1083 households in 1999 with heads 
working in enterprises. Table 2 reports the sample characteristics. 
 
Table 2  Characteristics of the sample  
  Household head in enterprises  Household head in public sector 
 1995  1999  1995  1999 
Age of household head %         
25-29 5.37  3.14  8.59  3.97 
30-34 17.3  10.9  23.55  12.62 
35-39 25.41  27.99  20.87  29.44 
40-44 31.1  31.24  24.56  23.83 
45-49 15.39  20.34  13.85  21.03 
50-59 5.42  6.39  8.59  9.11 
Education of head 
(years) 
10.34 11.04  12.35  12.93 
Gender of head 
(male, %) 
64.00 61.84  66.85  67.06 
Occupation of head (%)         
professionals 20.13  36.14  21.17  38.79 
Responsible person  9.88  22.27  11.53  22.43 
Clerical/office staff  18.03  31.70  16.14  30.14 
Manufacturing worker  47.50  8.23  43.29  6.07 
Others 4.46  1.66  7.86  2.57 
Household income  
(10 thousands) 
1.56 1.77  1.69  2.23 
Household size  
(numbers) 
3.01 2.91  3.00  2.87 
sample size  2196  954  1083  428 
 
 
A. Changes in pension wealth  
 
We compute pension wealth at the individual level using the applicable policy rules (See 
appendix). Despite the complexity of these calculations, the value of pension wealth could 
not be precisely measured. Just as others have pointed out (e.g. Feldstein, 1974; Attanasio 
& Brugiavini, 2003), the precise pension wealth is not required in the sense that the pen-
sion wealth could reflect the magnitude of the decline during these periods rather than the 
actual levels of pension wealth. 
Table 3 reports averages of net pension wealth for households in different em-
ployment groups and cohorts in the sample, and we compare those for 1995 and 1999. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




There is a substantial decline in households whose head is working in enterprises and a 
substantial increase in households whose head is working in the public sector in each co-
hort. The outcome may be due to pension reform for enterprises or to different household 
incomes in the 1995 and 1999 samples. So we further compute the ratio of pension wealth 
to current household income and changes therein during the two periods of time. There is 
obvious evidence of how reform affects households working in enterprises and different 
cohorts. For households whose head is in enterprises, this ratio declined by 26.61% on av-
erage, whereas for the younger cohorts the decline was much greater. For households 
whose head works in the public sector, few changes were found in this ratio, and the aver-
age change is 0.61%.  
 
Table 3 Changes in pension wealth  
  Present value of pension benefits  
(10 thousands) 
Pension wealth, % of household in-
come (%) 
Age and sector 
of household 
head 
1995 1999  Changes 
(%) 
1995 1999  Changes 
(%) 
Enterprises  18.74  15.80  -15.68  13.22  9.71  -26.61 
25-29  17.99 15.63  -13.14 18.41 10.96  -40.50 
30-34  19.49 16.29 -16.41  15.56  9.47 -39.13 
35-39  18.81 15.05 -19.98  13.51  9.80 -27.46 
40-44  18.44 15.26 -17.25  12.08  9.73 -19.44 
45-49 19.14  17.49  -8.63  11.39  9.60  -15.70 
50-59 17.32  15.59  -9.99  11.07  9.29  -16.10 
Public sector  24.80  34.10  37.49  16.31  16.21  0.61 
25-29  26.50 37.32 40.85 22.03 21.12 -4.13 
30-34  25.79 36.75 42.47 19.23 20.11  4.55 
35-39  24.57 34.62 40.93 16.09 16.69  3.73 
40-44  24.21 31.31 29.33 14.45 15.11  4.53 
45-49  24.50 34.14 39.32 13.44 14.51  7.96 
50-59  23.16 34.60 49.38 13.09 13.97  6.75 
Note: present value of pension benefits is the sum of that value for head and spouse and so is household income. 
Pension wealth is in 10 thousands of 1995 RMB YUAN. 
 
B. Changes of household saving 
 
 Household saving is measured as household disposable income minus household con-
sumption in the same year as a percentage of disposable income. We use two measures for 
household consumption. The first one includes expenditure on education and health care, 
which can be viewed as investment in human capital. We also measure consumption exclu-
sive of expenditures on education and health care, so that the effect of pension wealth on Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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household’s human capital investment can be compared with the effect on other consump-
tion.  
SR1= (household disposable income - total consumption)/ household disposable 
income 
SR2= (household disposable income - consumption without education and health 
care)/ household disposable income 
Table 4 reports average saving rates of households in different sectors and co-
horts. There is an obvious increase in saving rates for all households over the period 1995 
to 1999, and the changes in households in the public sector are as great as those in house-
holds in enterprises. For example, SR1 in both sectors rose by 5 percentage points on aver-
age, SR2 in both sectors rose by 9 percentage points on average. Average saving rates of 
the youngest households increased most in both sectors. Therefore, a simple comparison 
between households of two employment groups does not yield clear evidence of an effect 
of pension wealth on household saving. We move on to estimating the degree of offset ef-
fect of pension wealth based on equation (7). 
 
Table 4 Changes in household saving rates (Mean saving per mean income) 
 SR1    SR2 
Age and sector 
of household 
head 
1995 1999  Change 
(%-pts) 
1995 1999  Change 
(%-pts) 
Enterprises  0.13   0.18  5  0.21  0.30   9 
25-29  0.04   0.19  15  0.11  0.27   16 
30-34  0.12   0.19  7  0.18  0.28   10 
35-39  0.14   0.19  5  0.20  0.29   9 
40-44  0.13   0.18  5  0.22  0.30   10 
45-49  0.16   0.17  1  0.26  0.33   7 
50-59  0.15   0.18  3  0.23  0.29   6 
Public sector  0.14   0.19  5  0.21  0.30   9 
25-29  0.14   0.26  12  0.19  0.34   15 
30-34  0.11   0.18  7  0.18  0.28   10 
35-39  0.14   0.19  5  0.21  0.30   9 
40-44  0.16   0.18  2  0.24  0.29   5 
45-49  0.13   0.18  5  0.23  0.33   10 
50-59  0.15   0.22  7  0.24  0.38   14 
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5  Results 
 
With pension wealth for each household in the sample, we use the adjustment factor in 
equation (5) to adjust pension wealth and future earnings of those households in the public 
sector and those households in enterprises in 1995 and we use the adjustment factor in 
equation (6) to adjust pension wealth and future earnings of households in enterprises in 
1999.
 13 Due to the fact that workers in enterprises and public sector were faced different 
stages of reform, the coefficients of the explanatory variables may differ. Therefore, we 
estimate equation (7) on samples of households in enterprises and in the public sector sepa-
rately. Robust standard errors are used to correct heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term.  
Tables 5 and 6 present OLS estimation results for enterprise and public sector samples re-
spectively. The key coefficient of interest is the effect of pension wealth on household sav-
ing. Results for both adjusted and unadjusted pension wealth are reported. The coefficient 
of unadjusted pension wealth relative to income is much smaller, although it is negative in 
all the regressions. This outcome is due to a mixture of variation in pension wealth and 
variation of current position in the life cycle. For households in enterprises, the coefficients 
of adjusted pension wealth relative to income are -0.257 when the dependent variable is 
SR1 and -0.217 for SR2, and statistically different from zero at less than the 1% level. The 
results indicate that an increase in pension wealth of 100 RMB will reduce saving by 25.7 
RMB or 21.7 RMB. The coefficient of the time dummy is about 0.20 and statistically sig-
nificant, which shows that there was an overall increase in household saving rate during 
this period of time because of economic and social change.
  Similar results were obtained 
for households in the public sector, and the offset effect of pension wealth is even larger. It 
is reasonable that people in the public sector rely more on public pensions after retirement 
and hence pension wealth would have a larger offset effect on private saving. We also ex-
plicitly estimate the effect of future earnings. There is a significantly negative effect of fu-
ture relative income in enterprises, but this effect is not significant in the public sector. 
This difference further implies that households in the public sector depend less on future 
earnings for consumption after retirement. It is noteworthy that the time effect is about 
 
13 In order to compute the adjustment factors, we will make specific assumptions about the rate of discount-
ing the future, the life expectancy of each age. We assume the discount rate is 4% and initial age is 25 in fol-
lowing regressions. Data of life expectancy at each age is from World Bank life table of China in 2003. Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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0.10 for households in the public sector, which indicates that macro shocks have caused 
greater increases in saving rates of households in enterprises than in the public sector. 
The OLS results might be biased because of the measurement issues and unobservable 
factors mentioned in section 3. Since pension reform in enterprises provided us with an 
exogenous source of variation for pension wealth, we can perform instrumental variable 
estimation for sample households and remove the bias from the estimates. When using IV 
technique, we only use those samples where the household head works in enterprises. We 
use as instruments the interaction between the time dummy and six age group dummies 
and the interaction between the time dummy and six provincial dummies. The validity of 
these instruments rests on the fact that pension wealth changes exogenously for employees 
of different ages and in different regions as between the two periods of time. It also de-
pends on the assumption that employees in enterprises did not switch to public sector jobs 
because of pension reform. This is a reasonable assumption in view of the fact that it is 
very difficult to switch from enterprise to public sector jobs after economic reform. There 
is no exogenous variation in reform-induced pension wealth of households in the public 
sector; however, the interaction term for the time dummy and a dummy indicating enter-
prise cannot be used as an IV, because other reforms occurred during the same periods of 
time that were different for the two employment sectors. Hence, we apply IV estimation 
only to sample households in enterprises.  
To assess the quality of the instruments, we check the rank condition regressing 
pension wealth on the full set of instruments and testing the null that the coefficients of the 
instruments are jointly equal to zero. The F-test rejects this null at the 1% level. The results 
from IV estimation are reported in table 7. When we exclude future earnings, we assume 
that their effect is captured by age dummies, occupation dummies and the time dummy. 
The coefficients of adjusted pension wealth relative to income vary little according to 
whether future earnings are included or excluded.
14 But the coefficients and the signifi-
cance of the age dummies vary substantially. They are not significant when future earnings 
are excluded, which implies that the life-cycle effect of saving behavior is partly due to 
differences in future earnings relative to current income in different stages of life. We 
 
14 The regression outcomes varied little with or without household assets. We exclude this variable from the 
final result. Household assets include total financial assets, estimated present market value of durable goods, 
estimated present market value of self-owned productive fixed assets, estimated present market value of pri-
vately-owned houses, plus estimated present market value of other assets.  
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check the sensitivity of the results to changes in the real interest rate and discount rate used 
in computing adjusted pension wealth. A reduction in the discount rate yields a slightly 
larger effect of pension wealth. 
The IV regressions indicate smaller effects of pension wealth than in the OLS re-
gressions: -0.18 for SR1 and -0.12 for SR2. The larger effect for SR1 means that pension 
wealth has a greater influence on investment in human capital than on consumption. When 
pension wealth declines, households reduce their expenditures on education and health for 
children in most cases by more than their other expenditures. On the other hand, if pension 
wealth increases, households will increase consumption, with a further increase in human 
capital investment.  
We also allow for the possibility that the effect of pension wealth on household 
saving changes over the life cycle. We split the sample into age groups that may be ex-
pected to differ in this respect. One group consists of household whose head is younger 
than 40, the other includes all the other households in enterprises. Results of IV regressions 
for these two groups are presented in table 8. The effects of pension wealth for younger 
households are very small and insignificant, while the effects for older households  are    
 -0.44 (SR1) and -0.37 (SR2). This suggests that there might be liquidity constraints for 
younger households. or that the motive for saving in the younger ages is not mainly for re-
tirement. According to Chamon and Prasad (2008), the main purpose of saving by young 
households is related to housing and education. It is hard to get reliable results by using an 
interaction term for pension wealth and age groups because of the validity of instruments. 
It is hard to identify the result as being age-related or a cohort effect. We present this result 
to compare with research in other countries, which report age-effects. Attanasio and 
Rohwedder (2003) find a substantial offset progressively increasing from 0.5 for people 
aged between 32-42 up to 0.7 for those aged 54-64. For younger workers, the effect was 
negligible. An age-dependent schedule is found also for Italian micro-data (Attanasio and 
Brugiavini, 2003), in which there is a U-shaped pattern: pension wealth is found to be a 
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Table 5 OLS estimation for households in enterprises 
  Adjusted pension wealth  Unadjusted pension wealth 
SR1 SR2 SR1  SR2 




























Age dummies         
Age 30-34  -0.095 (0.030)**  -0.088 (0.028)**  -0.058  
(0.028)*  -0.053 (0.026)* 
































Gender  0.037 (0.011)***  0.029  
(0.009)**  0.041 (0.011)***  0.032 
(0.009)*** 
Education  0.003 (0.002)  0.003 (0.002)  0.004 (0.002)*  0.004 (0.002)* 
Occupations        





(0.023)**  0.052 (0.020)** 
Responsible  
person  0.040 (0.026)  0.037 (0.023)  0.047 (0.026)  0.042 (0.023) 
Clerical/office staff  0.008 (0.023)  0.005 (0.020)  0.016 (0.023)  0.012 (0.020) 
Manufacturing 
worker  0.039 (0.021)  0.03 (0.018)  0.041 (0.021)*  0.032 (0.018) 
Household  
size  -0.011 (0.012)  0.002 (0.010)  -0.012 (0.011)  0.002 (0.010) 
Provincial  
dummies 
yes yes Yes  Yes 
R square  9.55  13.27  12.39  16.44 
observations 3150  3150 3510  3510 
Reference group for age is age 25-29, reference group for occupation is other occupations. Robust standard errors are 
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Table 6 OLS estimation for households in public sector 
  Adjusted pension wealth  Unadjusted pension wealth 
SR1 SR2 SR1  SR2 






(0.080)***  -0.013 (0.003)***  -0.010 
(0.002)*** 






(0.060)  -0.006 (0.002)**  -0.006 (0.002)** 
Year 1999  0.083 (0.018)***  0.134 
(0.016)***  0.093 (0.018)***  0.143 (0.016)*** 
Age dummies         
Age 30-34  -0.148 
(0.035)*** 
-0.127 
(0.033)***  -0.096 (0.030)**  -0.077 (0.027)** 
Age 35-39  -0.229 
(0.048)*** 
-0.205 
(0.046)***  -0.146 (0.037)***  -0.125 
(0.034)*** 
Age 40-44  -0.283 
(0.056)*** 
-0.243 
(0.053)***  -0.191 (0.044)***  -0.154 
(0.040)*** 
Age 45-49  -0.349 
(0.063)*** 
-0.269 
(0.059)***  -0.259 (0.053)***  -0.184 
(0.048)*** 
Age 50-59  -0.373 
(0.069)*** 
-0.288 
(0.063)***  -0.288 (0.061)***  -0.209 
(0.055)*** 
Gender  0.004 (0.016)  0.002 (0.014)  0.019 (0.016)  0.016 (0.014) 
Education  0.006 (0.003)*  0.004 (0.002)  0.007 (0.003)**  0.005 (0.002)* 
Occupation        
professionals 0.018  (0.035) -0.018  (0.029) 0.025  (0.035) -0.013  (0.030) 
Responsible  
person  0.022 (0.036)  -0.008 (0.030)  0.030 (0.036)  -0.003 (0.031) 
Clerical/office 
staff  0.032 (0.035)  -0.008 (0.029)  0.038 (0.035)  -0.003 (0.030) 
worker  0.011 (0.043)  -0.022 (0.037)  0.011 (0.043)  -0.023 (0.037) 
Household size  -0.009 (0.016)  0.003 (0.013)  -0.006 (0.016)  0.005 (0.013) 
Provincial  
dummies 
yes yes Yes Yes 
R square  8.85  13.34  11.39  15.36 
observations 1510  1510  1510 1510 
Reference group for age is age 25-29, reference group for occupation is other occupations. Robust standard errors are 
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Table 7  IV estimation for households with head working in enterprises 































Age dummies         













































(0.011)***  0.034 (0.010)*** 
Education  0.002 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002)  0.003 (0.002)  0.003 (0.002) 
Occupation       
professionals 0.047  (0.023)* 0.037  (0.021)  0.056  (0.023)* 0.046 (0.020)* 
Responsible  
person  0.038 (0.025)  0.033 (0.023)  0.04 (0.025)  0.036 (0.022) 
Clerical/office 
staff  0.003 (0.023)  0 (0.020)  0.008 (0.023)  0.005 (0.020) 
Manufacturing 
worker  0.031 (0.021)  0.022 (0.019)  0.039 (0.021)  0.03 (0.019) 
Household size  -0.011 (0.011)  0.002 (0.010)  -0.011 (0.011)  0.003 (0.009) 
Provincial  
dummies 
yes yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of IV  10  10  10  10 
F-test for instru-
ments 
F(33, 3116)=125.14***  F(34, 3116)=302.50*** 
Adjusted R square  7.08  9.96  8.67  12.24 
observations 3150  3150  3150  3150 
Reference group for age is age 25-29, reference group for occupation is other occupations. Robust standard errors are 
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Table 8 Age related effect (IV regression) 
  Age of household head<40  Age of household head>40 






















(0.077)**  -0.198 (0.064) 








Number of IV  7  7  7  7 
F-test for  
instruments 
F(28, 1428)=129.67***  F(28, 1664)=187.32*** 
Adjusted R 
square 
8.91 10.50  9.17 14.07 
observations  1457 1457  1664 1664 
The estimation includes future earnings. Other controlled variables are the same as in table 7. 
 
We compare our results with others. Feldstein (1974) uses time series aggregate data to 
verify the substitution relationship between social security wealth and personal saving in 
the US, the social security wealth depresses personal saving by 30-50 percent. Micro-data 
evidence found in King & Dicks-Mireau (1982) pointed to a 25 cent decrease in Canadian 
household financial wealth following a 1-dollar increase in pension wealth. 20 percent or 
less offset was found based on US micro-data by Diamond and Hausman (1984) and Hub-
bard (1986). But some studies suggest there is no offset of pension on private saving (e.g. 
Kotlikoff, 1979; Venti and Wise, 1990; Aso and He, 2001). Gale (1998) corrects the bias 
in previous studies and finds larger offset effects: -0.66 for households with saving incen-
tive accounts (households with less liquidity constrain), -0.68 for households with higher 
education (households with lower income risk), -0.37 for households with lower education. 
Using Italian micro-data, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) obtain an estimate of an average 
effect of -0.35 for Italy and even larger effects in some cases. Bottazzi, et al.(2006) obtain 
an average effect of -0.65 for Italy. Compared with more recent results, the offset effect of 
pension wealth in China seems to be relatively small. There are many reasons for this find-
ing. Besides the common reasons such as liquidity constraints and the precautionary and 
bequest saving motives, uncertainty as to future pension benefits also plays a role. For ex-
ample, the misuse of the funds in the supposedly funded individual accounts, which remain Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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notional, and the weak performance of financial markets raise doubt about the value of in-
dividual accounts (Yuan and Feng, 2005). 
To get a sense of the magnitudes of the effect of pension reform on household 
saving, we compute pension wealth for samples in enterprises in 1999 applying policy 
rules before and after reform respectively and present changes of adjusted pension wealth 
relative to income for households due to the reform. Then we use the offset effect obtained 
to estimate the changing of household saving caused by pension reform. According to our 
estimation, the household saving rate increases by 2.78 percentage points for cohort aged 
50-59 in year 1999, 6.31 for cohort aged 25-29 in year 1999. This provides one explanation 
for the largest increase in household saving rates among the youngest households in our 
sample. More information is presented in table 9.  
 
 
Table 9 Estimated changes in household saving rates caused by pension reform  
  Adjusted pension wealth / household income  Change in saving rates 
(%-pts) 
Cohort Pre-reform  Post-reform Change  SR1  SR2
1  0.94   0.59  -0.35  6.31   4.21 
2  0.84   0.52  -0.32  5.77   3.85 
3  0.86   0.55  -0.30  5.43   3.62 
4  0.84   0.57  -0.27  4.82   3.21 
5  0.77   0.59  -0.18  3.31   2.21 
6  0.76   0.61  -0.15  2.78   1.85 
Cohorts 1-6 refer to households aged 25-29, 30-34, 35-39,40-44, 45-49, 50-59 in year 1999 respectively. The coefficient 
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6  Conclusions 
 
We explain the high household saving rates in China from a new perspective. During 
1995-1999, there was a substantial pension reform for enterprise employees in China. We 
use the variation in pension wealth caused by policy to estimate the impact of pension 
wealth on household saving explicitly. We use two sets of cross-section data, one for 1995 
(before reform) and one for 1999 (after reform). We compute the discounted present value 
of pension benefits at the individual level using the applicable policy rules, and we adjust 
pension wealth for different positions the household life cycle. There was an obvious de-
cline in pension wealth for households in enterprises and very little change for households 
in the public sector. In contrast, household saving in both employment groups increased 
during 1995-1999. Econometric results indicate significant offset effects of pension wealth 
in both groups. We take advantage of pension reform to create instrumental variables to 
remove the bias caused by measurement errors and unobservable factors, and obtain an 
offset effect of -0.18. Our estimations show that pension reform caused the household sav-
ing rate to increase by about 6 percentage points for cohorts aged 25-29 in 1999 and about 
3 percentage points for cohorts aged 50-59. Almost 50% of enterprise employees are cov-
ered by pension scheme, and it is possible that pension reform that reduced the replace-
ment rate contributed to the observed increase in aggregate household saving rates. 
However, compared to other countries, the effect of pension wealth is smaller in 
China. This could be due to a number of reasons. Our results also show that there is a 
greater effect on human capital investment. Other things being equal, declining pension 
wealth reduces expenditure more on education and health than on other consumption. In a 
process of population aging, cutting down pension benefits is a general tendency. How-
ever, human capital investment is related to productivity and is crucial for development. 
Thus more government investment in human capital is needed at the same time.  
Because of sample limitations, in this paper we cannot measure the effect of pro-
viding pension benefits to those who were not covered by a pension scheme. In a country 
where the pension scheme is still being extended to cover more and more people, this is an 
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Appendix  Estimation of future earnings and pension wealth 
 
In order to estimate pension wealth, we need to project gross earnings from an individual’s 
current age to retirement age. We use samples of people between 20-59 years of age wage 
income in years 1995, 1999 and 2002 to project the forward gross earnings. We use an 
econometric specification to get an age-earnings profile for different individuals and pre-
dict the annual gross earnings for each individual. In order to reflect the cohort effect of 
wage growth, we also assume an average wage growth rate. The variables controlled in 
wage equation are age, education, occupation, sector of employment and regional dum-
mies. 
Based on gross earnings in the year before retirement, we compute the first year’s 
pension benefit applying the rules which were applicable to employees in different sectors. 
In year 1995, employees in both the public sector and in enterprises came under the same 
policy. The monthly pension income is a certain portion of wage income when retired (the 
replacement ratio is in table 1). To get the total pension benefit, we then compute benefits 
for later years using the first year’s pension benefit and the growth rate of average income.  
Pension wealth is defined as the present value of expected pension income from 
retirement age to life-expectancy age. We estimate both gross pension wealth and net pen-
sion wealth. The latter is obtained by subtracting from gross pension wealth the expected 
value of future contributions that a worker pays from current age until retirement.   
In year 1995, the gross pension wealth and net pension wealth for individual   













=× × + + ∑                 (1) 
where  i LPold is present value pension wealth,  (, 1 ) ˆ
iT R E − is projected earnings for 
the year before retirement age,   is the replacement ratio; T  is life expectancy at current 
age, TRis retirement age (60 for males, 55 for females).  is the average real wage growth 





For 1999, the pension wealth is calculated under the new policy, which was dif-
ferent for employees in the public sector and in enterprises. For those working in the public 
sector, the formula is the same as equation (1). For employees of enterprises, we use the BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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rules in table 1 to compute gross pension wealth from each of the two pillars and the transi-
tional pension respectively for “middle workers”.  
i LTBB is present basic pension wealth for individual i at age  :  a
() ()









=× + + ∑
−                                                                       (2) 
where  (, 1 ) mit E − is regional average wage at age  1 t− . Other symbols have the same 
meanings as before. 
i LTPB is present value of pension wealth from an individual account: 
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where  is the rate of investment return on an individual account and  is the age 
at which the individual account was established.
Ir 1 a
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+ ∑                                                                                       (4) 
where  (, 1 ) ii m i T TB coefficient L E Q − R i = ×× ×, which is a formula for the policy. The 
coefficient is 1.3% in most regions.  iis working experience to year 1997,  is the wage 
index of individual i, which is calculated as the ratio of individual wage to regional aver-
age wage. 
L i Q
When computing the net pension wealth in 1999, we take into consideration the 
contributions of employees, which is 8% of the worker’s wage income, i.e. the projected 
gross earnings for the last year. We disregard the contributions of employers, which are 
20% of the average wage income of the enterprise in the last year. So the present value of 
future contributions up to retirement age is a rather small fraction of gross pension wealth. 
Accordingly, we define future earnings as the present value of the gross earnings 
from survey year to the year before retirement age. The present value of gross earnings is 
  
                                                 
4% Ir
15 Referring to the investment rate for the “Fund of social security of China” and the interest rate on a 5-year 
deposit, we assume  = . Jin Feng, Lixin He and Hiroshi Sato  
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=⋅ + + ∑                   (5) 
where   is individual  ’s present value of future earnings in the period from 
age   to retirement age. is the predicted gross earnings of individual   of age   years; 
is the age in the survey year. Other symbols have the same meanings as before. 
i LTW i
a () ˆ
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